I. INTRODUCTION
On April 7, 1987, Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall blocked the deportation of alleged Nazi war criminal Karl Linnas to consider, one final time, whether the United States should deport Linnas to the Soviet Union, where a Soviet court had sentenced him to death in absentia.' Linnas stood accused of participating in Nazi atrocities as head of the Nazi Concentration Camp at Tartu, Estonia during World War 11.2 A New York Federal District Court revoked Linnas' citizenship in 1981, after the United States brought a denaturalization action against him. 3 After finding Linnas deportable under United States immigration laws, an Administrative LawJudge of the Immigration and Naturalization Service set Linnas' deporta-may denaturalize and deport to the Soviet Union.3 2 Linnas' case must be examined in light of the eighth amendment and the right to due process guaranteed by the fifth amendment, 3 3 or it is possible that other alleged 34 Nazi war criminals might face denaturalization and deportation without adequate protection of their rights. Further, a solution to this problem may also ensure that actual Nazi war criminals will not escape justice in the United States.
This Comment explores the constitutional arguments against the denaturalization and deportation process as that process is applied to alleged Nazi war criminals. This Comment concludes that the current denaturalization and deportation process may violate the eighth amendment and the Due Process Clause of the fifth amendment by depriving individuals such as Linnas of their lives and liberty without a fair criminal trial, often through the use of decidedly problematic evidence. After detailing the due process problems of the current system, this Comment proposes a solution, calling for the trial of alleged Nazi war criminals in the United States, where the American criminal system will ensure the safeguarding of their rights under United States laws. 
4.
33 The fifth amendment provides that: No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a GrandJury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
U.S. CONST. amend. V. 34 The word "alleged" is used throughout this Comment because the United States has not proven in a crminal court that the defendants in denaturalization and deportation cases are guilty of criminal conduct "beyond a reasonable doubt." Under United States constitutional criminal procedure, criminal defendants are afforded a trial by a jury of their peers, in which the government must show guilt by "proof beyond a reasonable doubt." In denaturalization proceedings, by contrast, one is not tried for his or her crimes, but instead on whether he or she has lied on either the application for admission to the country or the application for naturalization. The standard of proof is "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" evidence. Maxwell Land Grant Case, 121 U.S. 325, 381 (1887). Also, there is no right of trial by jury in denaturalization proceedings, Luria v. United States, 231 U.S. 9, 27-28 (1913), or in deportation proceedings, Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 227, 237-39 (1912) . The right to trial byjury in criminal cases is guaranteed in the United States Constitution. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. It is also guaranteed in "[s]uits at common law." U.S. CONsT. amend. VII. Nesselson and Lubet advocate pre-trial motions in denaturalization and deportation proceedings as a means of ensuring that any evidence admitted is reliable. See Nesselson & Lubet, supra note 22 at 79-80.
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II. BACKGROUND

A. THE "DISPLACED PERSONS ACT"
To understand how the denaturalization and deportation processes function with regard to alleged Nazi war criminals, it is necessary to understand how such individuals first entered the United States. Karl Linnas, and others like him, 35 entered the United States under the the Displaced Persons Act ("DPA"). 3 6 The DPA was enacted in 1948 and allowed European refugees of World War II to gain admission to the United States despite traditional immigration quotas. 3 7 The DPA allowed individuals displaced from their native lands during World War II to find a haven in the United States, because these individuals could not "return to any of such countries because of persecution or fear of persecution on account of race, religion or political opinions." 38 The DPA excluded those who persecuted civilians. 3 9 If an individual made misrepresentations on his or her admission application for the United States which were discovered prior to admission, he or she could not enter. 40 An official of the International Refugee Organization ("IRO") 4 1 initially determined whether each person seeking admission to the United States qualified as a displaced person. 4 nation, an official of the Displaced Persons Commission 43 interviewed the applicant to decide whether he or she was eligible under the DPA. 4 4 A vice consul from the State Department would then make a decision on the given applicant. 4 5 Finally, the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") made certain, through reviewing the case, that the individual was admissible under United States immigration laws. 4 6 Once the individual passed these requirements, as Linnas did in 1951, the United States considered the person eligible for admission into the United States.
In the course of gaining legal admission to the United States, an individual must fill out forms listing past crimes, convictions, and organizations with which the individual was involved. 4 7 Under the DPA, the United States conducted a thorough investigation into the applicant's background as well as questioned the applicant prior to granting admission. 4 8 Thus, pursuant to the DPA, Linnas had to sign a sworn statement prior to receiving his immigration visa. 49 
B. THE NATURALIZATION AND DENATURALIZATION PROCESS
In order to become a citizen of the United States, a person must gain lawful admission into the United States as a permanent resident. 50 The DPA offered individuals displaced during World War II an immediate means of gaining such admission. 5 1 Individuals who lied in order to gain admission took a slot that could have gone to a 43 The Displaced Persons Act, 62 Stat. 1009 (1948) , created the Displaced Persons Commission to: make provisions for necessary supplies, facilities, and services to carry out the provisions and accomplish the purposes of this Act. It should be the duty of the Commission to formulate and issue regulations, necessary under the provisions of this Act, and in compliance therewith, for the admission into the United States of eligible displaced orphans and eligible displaced persons. Id. at 1012. 44 Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 495-6. 45 Id. 46 Id. at 496. Other immigration laws existed at the time that could exclude an individual from the United States. Section 5 of the DPA provided that such individuals should still be excluded even if they qualified as displaced persons. true victim. Once an individual gained admission into the United States under the DPA, he or she had the opportunity to become a naturalized citizen of the United States after living continuously here for five years, and exhibiting "good moral character" during that period. 5 2 In an application for naturalization, 53 the applicant must fill out another form disclosing, once again under oath, past criminal activities, organizational affiliations, and military service.
54
Linnas filled out a similar form in order to gain United States citizenship. 55 The government also interviewed him under oath and questioned him extensively about his past. 56 [Vol. 80 cifically aimed the legislation at Nazi war criminals to ensure that none would find a haven from their crimes in the United States.
62
The Holtzman Amendment, in part, provides for the deportation of any alien who, during World War II, in association with the Nazi government of Germany, "ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person because of race, religion, national origin, or political opinion." 63 It made ex-Nazis ineligible for visas, 64 and eliminated the attorney general's ability to admit them as temporary nonimmigrants. 6 5 It also removed an exNazi's ability to voluntarily depart from the United States. Unlike other deportable aliens, individuals falling under this legislation cannot have their deportation blocked by the Attorney General of the United States. 67 The type of persecution the alien might face in the nation to which he or she is deported is irrelevant. 68 Unlike other aliens, who may depart voluntarily, 69 alleged Nazis may not since the enactment of the Holtzman Amendment.
70
Without these misrepresentations, they would not be eligible for admission or naturalization. These lies carried over to the naturaliza-62 Representative Elizabeth Holtzman of New York sponsored the Amendment, and stated during the debates on it:
Mr. Speaker, the presence of Nazi war criminals in the United States constitutes the unfinished business of World War II. By taking a forthright stand against allowing these mass murderers a haven in this country, we will not only reaffirm our commitment to human rights but we will be making it clear that persecution in any form is repugnant to democracy and to our way of life. 124 CONG. REC. H31647 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1978)(statements of Rep. Holtzman). 63 The Holtzman Amendment provides, in part, that anyone: under the direction of, or in association with-(A) the Nazi government of Germany, (B) any government in any area occupied by the military forces of the Nazi government of Germany, (C) any government established with the assistance or cooperation of the Nazi government of Germany, or (D) any government which was an ally of the Nazi government of Germany, ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person because of race, religion, national origin, or political opinion. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(19) (1982 
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COMMENT tion forms. 7 1 Lying on the forms, however, led to denaturalization and possibly to deportation under the Immigration and Nationality Act. 72 The United States must prove by "clear, uneqivocal and convincing evidence" 78 that the defendant concealed a material fact or made a willful misrepresentation on these forms. The United States attorney for a given district has a duty to bring denaturalization proceedings "upon affidavit showing good cause." 74 The United States attorney brings these proceedings in federal district court. 75 If the United States can prove by "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" evidence 76 that the individual falsified material information on either the entry forms or the naturalization forms, 77 it can subject him or her to denaturalization and deportation proceedings.
Linnas' denaturalization occurred, in part, because he made "willful, material misrepresentations" on his entry forms. 7 8 Prior to denaturalization, the government must show that such misrepresentations are material. In Chaunt v. United States, 79 the Supreme Court interpreted the term "material" as used in § 1451(a) denaturalization proceedings. In Chaunt, the United States attempted to denaturalize a native of Hungary. 8 0 The United States alleged that Chaunt had falsely denied his membership in the Communist Party and had misrepresented his arrest record on his naturalization forms. 8 ' The Court found that the naturalization officials could infer Chaunt's communist affiliation from his admission that he was a member of the International Workers' Order, a group controlled by the Communist Party. 82 88 In evaluating the materiality of such misrepresentations under § 1451 (a) of the INA, the Court began by noting that the misrepresentations must be both "willful and material." 89 The Court explained the test as:
[W]hether the misrepresentation or concealment was predictably capable of affecting, i.e., had a natural tendency to affect, the official decision. The official decision in question, of course, is whether the applicant meets the requirements for citizenship, so that the test more specifically is whether the misrepresentation or concealment had a natural tendency to produce the conclusion that the applicant was qualified. This test must be met, of course, by evidence that is clear, unequivocal, and convincing. 90 Justice Scalia stated that misrepresentations as to the date and place of Kungys' birth were not material. 9 Once the United States denaturalizes an individual, the government may find him or her deportable. Under the Holtzman Amendment, the United States must bring deportation proceedings against those involved with the army of Nazi Germany. 9 2 A "special inquiry officer" of the Immigration and Naturalization Service conducts the deportation proceedings. 9 3 After this officer conducts the administrative deportation hearing, he or she may order deportation if such a decision is supported by "clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence. ' '94 Once the officer orders deportation, the alien may appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the circuit in which the administrative proceeding occurred. 95 The court then decides the case based upon the administrative record and the Attorney General's findings of fact. 96 If such evidence is "clear, unequivocal and convincing," '9 7 the court will sustain the deportation order. 98
C.
THE The Government sought to establish that Linnas was a member of the Selbstschutz, a group of native Estonians who aided the German military forces in Estonia beginning in the summer of 1941,108 while Linnas claimed he was a university student in Tartu during 1940-1943.109 At trial, an expert on the Holocaust, Professor Hilberg, testified that the Selbstschutz aided mobile Nazi killing units known as "Einsatzkommandos" in making the Tartu area of Estonia (C) any government established with the assistance or cooperation of the Nazi government of Germany, or (D) any government which was an ally of the Nazi government of Germany, ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person because of race, religion, national origin, or political opinion. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(19) (1982).
(h) Withholding of deportation or return (1) The Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien (other than an alien described in section 1251(a)(19) of this title) to a country if the Attorney General determines that such alien's life or freedom would be threatened in such country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.
(2) Paragraph (1) shall not apply to any alien if the Attorney General determines that -(A) the alien, ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion; (B) the alien, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of the United States; (C) there are serious reasons for considering that the alien has committed a serious nonpolitical crime outside the United States prior to the arrival of the alien in the United States; or (D) there are reasonable grounds for regarding the alien as a danger to the security of the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982) .
(e) Voluntary departure The Attorney General may, in his discretion, permit any alien under deportation proceedings, other than an alien within the provisions of paragraph (4), (5), (6), (7), (11), (12), (14), (15), (16), (17), (18), or (19) of section 1251(a) of this title (and also any alien within the purview of such paragraphs if he is also within the provisions of paragraph (2) of subsection (a) of this section), to depart voluntarily from the United States at his own expense in lieu of deportation if such alien shall establish to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that he is, and has been, a person of good moral character for at least five years immediately preceding his application for voluntary departure under this subsection. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(e) (1982 116 The DPA makes those who "have assisted the enemy in persecuting civil populations of countries" inadmissible to the United States.
1 7 The District Court found Linnas inadmissible to the United States, because he served in the German armed forces as head of the Tartu concentration camp, and, thus, had persecuted civilians.
1 8 In omitting this from his entrance papers, Linnas had misrepresented his background in order to be admitted to the United States, and, thus, had illegally entered under the DPA. 1 19 The District Court further found that, at the time of his entrance into the United States, Linnas lacked the requisite "good moral character" required under the Immigration and Nationality Act. 120 Once an individual is denaturalized, he or she is considered an alien and may go through a separate process for deportation.1 2 5 In the case of individuals suspected of involvement with the Nazis, denaturalization inevitably leads to deportation proceedings.' 26 Once Linnas was stripped of his citizenship, the Government began deportation proceedings against him as an immediately deportable alien under the Holtzman Amendment. 2 7 An immigration judge found Linnas deportable.' 2 8 The standard used for deportation is the same as that used for denaturalization: proof by "clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence."'
29
Under federal immigration law, an individual found deportable may specify to which country he or she wishes to be deported.' 30 If that country accepts the individual, he or she is free to depart. Linnas chose the "free and independent Republic of Estonia."' 13 The Soviet Union had incorporated the independent Republic of Esto- Linnas appealed the deportation order to the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA"). 135 The BIA affirmed the immigration judge's decision, except as to the country of deportation, 1 3 6 since the United States has never recognized the Soviet incorporation of Estonia. 1 3 7 Accordingly, the BIA remanded the decision to the immigration judge with orders to specify a statutory basis for such a designation.1 3 8 On remand, the immigration judge found Linnas' deportation to the Soviet Union justified under those subsections of the Immigration and Nationality Act' 3 9 which provide for deportation to the place of the alien's birth or to any country willing to accept the particular alien.' 40 The BIA affirmed this decision based on the subsection' 4 ' which provides for deportation to any country that will accept the alien.' 42 134 Id. 135 Id. The Board of Immigration Appeals is a quasi-judicial body that hears immigration appeals, including appeals for relief from deportation orders, exclusion of aliens, petitions to classify the status of alien relatives, and fines imposed for violations of immigration laws. The BIA has nationwide jurisdiction to hear appeals by District directors of the Immigration and Naturalization Service as well as immigration judges. The United States Attorney General may modify or overrule decisions of the BIA. The decisions of the BIA are also subject to judicial review in the federal courts. (1) to the country from which such alien last entered the United States; (2) to the country in which is located the foreign port at which such alien embarked for the United States or for foreign contiguous territory; (3) to the country in which he was born; (4) to the country in which the place of his birth is situated at the time he is ordered deported; (5) to any country in which he resided prior to entering the country from which he entered the United States; (6) to the country which had sovereignty over the birthplace of the alien at the time of his birth; or (7) if deportation to any of the foregoing places or countries is impracticable, inadvisable, or impossible, then to any country which is willing to accept such alien into its territory. 141 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a)(7) (1982). 142 (1984) , to describe the criteria for a Bill of Attainder. The court considered whether the statute (1) is "'within the historical meaning of legislative punishment;' " (2) has a " 'further nonpunitive legislative purpose;'" and (3) "'evinces a congressional intent to punish' " considering the legislative record. Id. at 1029 (quoting Selective Serv., 468 U.S. at 852). The court relied on precedent to decide that deportation of a noncitizen was not punishment. COMMENT plained that the eighth amendment "was designed to protect those convicted of crimes."' 160 In Ingraham the Court first considered whether the paddling of Florida school children constituted cruel and unusual punishment violative of the eighth amendment. 16 The Court decided that it did not apply, because "[t]he prisoner and the schoolchild stand in wholly different circumstances, separated by the harsh facts of criminal conviction and incarceration."' 16 2 However, the criminal and Karl Linnas did not necessarily "stand in wholly different circumstances." Unlike paddled school children, Linnas stood convicted of crimes in the Soviet Union and was incarcerated in the United States.'
6 3 Under such circumstances, Linnas' denaturalization and deportation raises eighth amendment issues.
The Soviet Union convicted Linnas for his participation in war crimes. The United States had no responsibility for his conviction and played no part in the proceedings. Therefore, the eighth amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause does not appear to apply to his case, for there was no action on the part of the United States with respect to Linnas' conviction and punishment. Yet, the United States knew of his sentence. The court knew that by deporting Linnas to the Soviet Union, it would be deporting him to his death.' 64 Under such circumstances, the United States could have recognized the implications of its decision on the individual involved. Morally, the courts, in effect, closed their eyes to Linnas' situation. This type of moral blindfold is convenient for cases involving Nazis, but has implications for other cases that may be more repugnant.
The United States does look to the effects of its actions beyond its borders in other cases. The Attorney General of the United States, may, in his discretion, stay deportation if he or she "concludes that deportation to such country would be prejudicial to the interests of the United States. In such a case, the Attorney General would look to the foreign country to determine if an exception was warranted. Congress has spoken through this particular exemption, and has specifically left alleged Nazi war criminals out of the exemption. 1 68 Perhaps the courts should side with Congress. Yet, it is doubtful that Congress considered the case of a Soviet death sentence. Further, the eighth amendment implications still remainwhether or not Congress has spoken.
There is still a further difficulty with the eighth amendment analysis as applied to Linnas' case. The eighth amendment traditionally applies solely to United States criminal cases. 1 6 9 In fact, the Court has held in the past that the amendment does not apply to deportation. 1 7 0 Yet, Linnas' deportation and denaturalization had oddly criminal characteristics. Linnas was denaturalized and deported "because of [his] active participation in the Nazi persecution of EstonianJews during World War II."171 Thus, it was his involvement in criminal activities that lead to his deportation. Specifically, it was his misrepresentations about affiliations with the Nazis that resulted in his deportation. 1 7 2 Linnas was deported and faced a death sentence because of lies on his naturalization and entry forms. Entering the United States by means of a "willfully false or misleading representation or the willful concealment of a material fact" is a mis- (1986), reh'g denied, 479 U.S. 1070 (1987) . 172 Id.
COMMENT demeanor, 173 and, for a repeat offender, a felony. 174 Yet, under United States law, "punishment should be proportionate to the crime. ' "175 Indeed, the eighth amendment prohibits "grossly disproportionate punishments."' 17 6 The punishment for the crimes Linnas participated in under United States law was up to $1,000 fine and/or two years in prison.' 77 This is not nearly a death sentence.
178
Linnas was also denaturalized and deported in part for his participation in murder. This certainly falls within the realm of crimes meriting the death penalty under United States laws. Yet, Linnas did not receive a full criminal trial. The United States had not convicted him of these crimes under the procedural due process standards required in a criminal case. Although the Soviet Union tried him in absentia, this trial did not satisfy United States due process requirements. 179 Thus, Linnas' case may have been mishandledeither under the dictates of the eighth amendment or the principles of due process. If Linnas' death sentence resulted from his participation in murders, he was not afforded the proper process to obtain a death sentence.
The courts could avoid this issue by ignoring the foreign death sentence or by blindly stating that this simply is not a criminal proceeding, and thus invocation of the eighth amendment is inappropriate. Yet, under the characteristics of a criminal proceeding stated by the Court in Ingraham, 1 80 the Linnas case resembles a criminal proceeding for eighth amendment purposes. Linnas was convicted and incarcerated. Although the conviction occurred in the Soviet Union, the eighth amendment implications still exist.
IV. DUE PROCESS CONSIDERATIONS OF THE LINNAS CASE
Linnas, as a naturalized citizen, had the full rights of United 173 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (Supp. IV 1986) . The Code provides for imprisionment for up to six months or a fine of up to $500, or both.
174 Id. Also, a defendant, "for a subsequent commission of any such offenses shall be guilty of a felon and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than two years, or by a fine of not more than $1,000, or both." Id. The Plyler Court applied these principles to equal protection.' 90 The Court stated that the concept of equal protection "is fundamentally at odds with the power the State asserts here to classify persons subject to its laws as nonetheless excepted from its protection."' 19 1 Thus, as first a citizen experiencing denaturalization and second as an alien experiencing deportation, Linnas had the right to due process of law.
A. DEPORTATION AS DISGUISED EXTRADITION
The Second Circuit quickly dismissed Linnas' due process arguments.' 9 2 The court did not consider Linnas' arguments that the United States had extradited him in the absence of an extradition 
Was Linnas Extradited?
The Second Circuit found arguments of due process grounded in the lack of an extradition treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union "ironic," for, as an alleged Nazi, Linnas had afforded none of his victims due process.1 94 The court failed to confront the issue of extradition in the absence of a treaty.' 9 5 In support of its decision, the Court explained that the requesting nation must initiate the extradition process. 19 6 Here, "the impetus for the denaturalization and removal of Linnas appears to have come from the government of the United States."' 197 Also, the court noted that Linnas requested the nation of his deportation, 9 8 so he had a choice, unlike in an extradition proceeding. In extradition proceedings, the defendant must return to the nation in which he or she allegedly committed the crime. Linnas, however, had no real choice. The Soviet Union was the only country that accepted him.' 9 9 Linnas had to go there.
0
The Second Circuit's argument that Linnas did not face extradition may gloss over the reality of his situation. Had the court deported Linnas while his trial pended in the Soviet Union, the Court would have sent him to the Soviet Union to stand trial. Sending an individual to stand trial in another country is illegal in the absence 193 200 The author realizes that this argument logically leads to no deportation of an alien to a country where that individual has been convicted of a crime in the absence of an extradition treaty. If an extradition treaty exists, the United States may extradite the individual.
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[Vol. 80 of an extradition treaty. 2 0 1 The court would have had difficulty ignoring this situation. Instead, Linnas was not present for his trial in the Soviet Union. Thus, Linnas had opportunity neither to present nor to participate in his defense. This situation is not tolerated under United States' standards of criminal justice and due process. 20 2 Yet, ironically, the denaturalization and deportation processes led him to face the Soviet death sentence without asserting a defense, for it permitted the court to ignore the de facto extradition in his case. Thus, unlike the normal extradition scenario in which the accused is sent to another country to stand trial, Linnas did not even have this opportunity, because the Soviets already tried him in absentia.
Although Linnas' conviction in absentia made it easier for the court to ignore the de facto extradition, that the Soviets had convicted Linnas in absentia should have made no difference in the court's analysis of his disguised extradition. Extradition is generally considered applicable to those already convicted in absentia.
3
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals considered a situation in which the foreign nation convicted the individual in absentia as being the same in effect as an extradition situation, at least where the United States had an extradition treaty with the other nation. In Antunes v. Vance, 20 4 the Fourth Circuit found a defendant extraditable when a French court had already convicted him in absentia for murder and sentenced him to life imprisonment. 20 5 The fact that Antunes faced life imprisonment did not enter into the court's opinion. 20 6 It considered probable cause the important aspect of the case. 2 0 7 The court looked at this deportation which followed convictions in absentia as an extradition where an extradition treaty existed. The lack of a pending trial in the Soviet Union should make no difference to Linnas' case. As a practical matter, Linnas seemed to face 201 The United States denaturalized and deported Feodor Fedorenko, a Nazi war criminal, to the Soviet Union where he ultimately was tried, convicted and executed. extradition to the Soviet Union. Labelling his situation "denaturalization" or "deportation" does not seem to counteract the final effect of the court's decision. Thus, this decision arguably constituted extradition in the absence of an extradition treaty.
The courts did not state whether the Soviet Union ever formally requested Linnas' extradition prior to the commencement of the denaturalization and deportation proceedings against him.
2 0 8 Yet, they agreed to take him, acknowledging that they had already convicted him there. Should it matter when the Soviet request for "extradition" came? The Soviets wanted Linnas for crimes, and the Justice Department knew it. Further, the Soviet Union could not formally ask for Linnas, for they knew, as well as United States officials, that no extradition treaty existed between themselves and the United States. Therefore, the Soviet Union could not expect the United States to hand Linnas over at their request. Instead, the Soviet Union waited and offered to take Linnas, so that they could carry out his death sentence. This amounts to de facto extradition in the absence of an extradition treaty.
9
The argument that Linnas was, in actuality, extradited, hinges on whether the United States is bound to look at the implications of its deportation decisions. Except in the political offense exemption to extradition situation, 2 10 the United States generally feels no 208 The Soviet Union has previously requested extradition of Nazi war criminals in the United States. However, due to the lack of an extradition treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union, these requests are regularly turned down. Rosenbaum, 210 See supra notes 165-68 and accompanying text.
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[Vol. 80 compulsion to look beyond its borders. 2 1 1 Individuals subject to deportation were never legally in the United States. Thus, the United States' obligation to look at the fate of the individual outside of the United States is, perhaps, minimal. Yet, when an individual's life is involved, and the foreign country's process is so contrary to American concepts of due process, there is a desire to look beyond the borders, and consider the implications of the deportation decision.
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The Implications of Extradition
Assuming, contrary to the Second Circuit's determination, that Linnas' deportation constituted a disguised extradition, the implications of the "extradition" on the process Linnas was afforded is far from clear. To begin with, one must examine the nature of extradition and contrast it with denaturalization and deportation to see what actual difference this made to the disposition of Linnas' case.
Through extradition, the United States deports an individual to stand trial in a foreign country which seeks the individual for criminal acts committed in that state. 2 1 3 Standards of proof for extradition are different from those used in American criminal process. In an extradition proceeding, the court does not determine guilt or innocence. 2 1 4 The court, instead, "determines only whether there is a sufficient legal basis to warrant the return of the fugitive to the requesting country." 2 1 5 This is a lower standard than "clear, unequivocal and convincing" 2 1 6 required for deportation and denaturalization. 2 The existence of an extradition treaty is significant, because such treaties are ratified with certain assumptions about the process of the requesting country. Extradition treaties are ratified by a twothirds, vote of the Senate and are signed into force by the president. 2 26 This shows that the "[e]xecutive has investigated the other country's criminal procedure and found it adequate.-2 27 As Justice Holmes stated for the majority in Glucksman v. Henkel, 2 28 "[w]e are bound by the existence of an extradition treaty to assume that the trial will be fair." 22 9 As Chief Justice Rehnquist explained while serving as an assistant attorney general: "extradition treaties are not negotiated with those countries which do not have either our form of due process or something we regard as the equivalent of it."230 Thus, there is an underlying assumption that individuals extradited in the presence of a treaty will recieve a fair trial, with their due process rights protected. Yet, it is unclear whether the opposite is true: the absence of an extradition treaty implies an absence of due process in the other nation. This, however, seems likely in the case of the Soviet Union, where the legal system differs greatly from that of the United States.
3 1
The Soviet Union presents particular due process problems in trying Americans, because its criminal justice system differs greatly from that of the United States. 23 2 For instance, the defendant in a criminal proceeding in the Soviet Union is confined until the government completes a preliminary investigation. 233 During this time, the defendant may not see, speak to or write to anyone. 2 3 4 Thus, he or she cannot begin to prepare a defense. 235 By contrast, in the United States, once the government has brought a suspect, not yet a defendant, into custody and questioned him or her, that individual's right to counsel attaches. 23 6 An accused must be afforded the right to counsel once the "adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated against him." 23 7 Once this process has begun, defendant's counsel must be present during pretrial line-ups, 23 8 preliminary hearing 23 9 and questioning, should the suspect so request. 2 40 By contrast, in the Soviet Union, the accused is not permitted counsel during the preliminary investigation, which amounts to a "dress rehearsal" for trial.
1
Further, there is often substantial pre-trial detention in the Soviet Union, which can lead to false confessions. 24 2 Moreover, either the police, procuracy or KGB interrogate the accused at length prior to trial, without the aid of counsel. 243 The Soviet system requires neither an arrest warrant, 24 4 nor a search warrant. 2 
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States provides a certain amount of protections in all these areas. 24 6 Courts in the United States generally do not concern themselves with the process used in other countries so long as an extradition treaty exists. 24 7 Yet, even if an extradition treaty had existed, the court still could have found grounds to block Linnas' deportation. The Second Circuit expressed concern with the criminal process in foreign countries even though an extradition treaty existed. In Gallina v. Fraser, 24 8 the Secretary of State began extradition proceedings against Gallina to return him to Italy, where an Italian court had convicted him in absentia. 24 9 The Second Circuit refused to consider the criminal procedure used in Italy to determine whether Gallina would receive due process, finding no authority for such consideration. 2 50 However, the court questioned the possible results of such a policy. 25 1 Although it ordered the extradition of Gallina, 25 2 the court explained its concern: "[n]evertheless, we confess to some disquiet at this result. We can imagine situations where the relator, upon extradition, would be subjected to procedures or punishment so antipathetic to a federal court's sense of decency as to require reexamination of the principle set out above." 2 53 The court here expressed the possibility, in spite of the presence of extradition treaties, that basic procedural requirements which are so fundamental to the American system could be lost in the extradition process. It also hinted that it might begin to look at the other country's process to determine if abuses were likely there, and refuse extradition on that basis.
54
Examining the procedural safeguards actually used in the country of extradition, the Second Circuit clarified its words in Gallina in 246 In the United States, criminal procedure varies from state to state. Most states allow a criminal defendant out on bail pending trial unless he or she is found "danger- Although the Canadian court dismissed the charges against the defendants on procedural grounds at trial, the court later entered convictions on appeal in the defendants' absence. 2 58 Thus, while convicted in absentia, the defendants were not tried in absentia.
59
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals decided that, because the defendants had the opportunity to defend themselves, their situation did not shock its "sense of decency." 2 60 Reaching this conclusion, the court explained that the "inability to assert a defense might be one of those instances" that warrant a blocking of extradition due to a conviction in absentia.
26 '
Linnas, as any other individual convicted in absentia and subject to denaturalization, was unable to assert any defense in the Soviet Union to the charges of his war crimes. Further, war crimes are considered "political" offenses in the Soviet Union. 26 2 Political cases are run by the KGB, 26 3 who regularly falsify evidence in such cases. 2 64 Under the reasoning of the Second Circuit in Gallina and Gengler, Linnas' case would be "antipathetic" to the court's sense of decency, for he was deprived of his life without the opportunity to assert a proper defense. Failing to recognize this, the Second Circuit, instead, decided Gallina was inapplicable to Linnas' case, 2 65 stating that his appeal to the court's sense of "decency" and "compassion" rang "hollow" in light of his own actions during World War 11. 266 The court made no further attempt to explain its argument, but simply dismissed the due process claim. . 1960) ). 266 Id.
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COMMENT Union and the United States, there is a possibility that the United States should not have deported Linnas. Yet, the lack of an extradition treaty lends strength to Linnas' case. Because no extradition treaty exists between the United States and the Soviet Union, his deportation would violate United States law, which requires an extradition treaty. 2 67 By implication, it may also violate his due process rights, if the reason for the lack of an extradition treaty between the two countries is due to a lack of due process in the Soviet Union. 26 8 Linnas argued that he had a due process right guaranteeing that he would not be extradited in the absence of such a treaty. 269 In reality, extradition affords the defendant a probable cause determination. 2 70 This allows the court to determine the probability of guilt.
27 1 Instead, in denaturalization and deportation the government had to show by "clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence" that his citizenship was illegally procured.
There is a certain amount of irony in Linnas' position. Although Linnas argued that an extradition treaty would be necessary for the United States to send him to face a Soviet death sentence, extradition would have afforded him less procedural safeguards than the actual deportation and denaturalization process he underwent. Extradition, like deportation and denaturalization, is not a criminal proceeding. Noble words such as "decency" and "compassion" ring hollow when spoken by a man who ordered the extermination of innocent men, women and children kneeling at the edge of a mass grave. Karl Linnas' appeal to humanity, a humanity which he has grossly, callously and monstrously offended, truly offends this court's sense of decency. nized the importance of the citizenship right at stake. First, denaturalization imposes heavy consequences upon the ex-citizen. Indeed, "
[d]enaturalization consequences may be more grave than consequences that flow from conviction for crimes." 276 Second, the courts consider American citizenship a "precious right" 2 7 7 and, thus, "naturalization decrees are not lightly to be set aside." 278 Indeed, the Supreme Court has gone so far as to say in the expatriation case of a United States military deserter "[w]e believe.., that use of denationalization as a punishment is barred by the Eighth Amendment. There may be involved no physical mistreatment, no primitive torture. There is instead the total destruction of the individual's status in organized society.
'2 79
Due to these characteristics of citizenship, the Supreme Court has held that the "[g]overnment carries a heavy burden of proof in a proceeding to divest a naturalized citizen of his citizenship.' ", 280 The burden of proof in denaturalization cases is a showing of "[c]lear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence which does not leave issues in doubt." 28 1 Justice Black described the Government's burden as "substantially identical with that required in criminal casesproof beyond a reasonable doubt." 28 2 In addition to this, the Court will not revoke citizenship without the individual there to present his or her case, just as it will not convict a person of a crime on 
COMMENT
States v. Vreeken, 28 5 a "defendant can successfully challenge the court's jurisdiction over his person if he is before the court in violation of an international treaty." 28 6 In Linnas' case, it is the lack of a treaty, he argued, that violated his rights. Thus, he used a statutory argument-that, by statute, the United States may only extradite in the presence of an extradition treaty.
B.
PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE
Several commentators have explored the problems of evidence in Nazi war criminal cases. 2 87 Rather than restating their arguments in their entirety, this section will provide a brief synopsis of the problems examined by these commentators as well as contemplate additional difficulties raised by Nazi cases. The problems of evidence in Nazi cases falls into three main categories: (1) suggestive identifications; (2) stale evidence; and (3) unreliable Soviet-source evidence.
Suggestive Identifications and Stale Evidence
The Supreme Court has recognized that eyewitness identifica- play, and, thereby pick out the wrong individual. 294 The United States conducted the Linnas identifications in the Soviet Union during a deposition by United States officials. 29 5 The United States Government showed three of the deponents a photographic spread of eight pictures. 29 6 The witnesses were elderly and were attempting to remember distant events. Their testimony was, therefore, of questionable reliability. Under these circumstances, the validity of the identification procedures used in Linnas' case merit further examination.
97
The District Court in United States v. Fedorenko, 2 98 considered the case of a photographic display followed by an in-court identification of an alleged Nazi war criminal. 2 99 The court explained that "[i]n view of the passage of 35 years from the date of the incidents, the court must scrutinize these identifications and the circumstances under which they were made with great care." 30 0 The court explained that the civil nature of the case made no difference, stating that "the concerns of the Supreme Court regarding the reliability and probative value of identifications made in criminal cases are no less applicable here. '30 1 In criminal cases, the courts consider five factors in deciding on the reliability of identifications. 3 0 2 These factors include:
the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness' degree of attention, the accuracy of his prior de- 294 Lubet & Reed, note 203, at 12. The individual conducting the photographic display can point, nod or make facial expressions, suggesting which photograph is correct. The district court in Linnas' case was admittedly disturbed by the identifications. The court explained:
The court however is disturbed by language used by the Soviet prosecutor when introducing members of 
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COMMENT scription of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated at the confrontation, and the time between the crime and the confrontation. Against these factors is to be weighed the corrupting effect of the suggestive identification itself.
3
The fifth factor enunciated by the Court-the time between the crime and the confrontation-is the major factor weighing against the admissibility of witnesses' depositions in Nazi war criminal cases.
30 4 With the passage of thirty-five years or more, the reliability of witnesses' testimony is questionable. The Court has emphasized the time element in past decisions.
30 5
The crimes Linnas allegedly committed occurred sometime between 1940 and 1944.306 Linnas entered the United States in 1951, and the denaturalization proceedings against him began in 1979.307 His trial in the Soviet Union occurred in 1962.308 The evidence in his case, therefore, was at least 35 years old at his denaturalization proceeding and 18 years old when he was tried in the Soviet Union.
The United States government relied on eyewitness testimony in his case. 3 0 9 The problem with eyewitness testimony in such a case is that it is sometimes as much as forty years old and witnesses are at least in their sixties when testifying.
3 10 Memory problems associated with these witnesses' advanced age render such testimony and identification questionable. Therefore, eyewitness identifications in Nazi war crimes cases are rife with problems, 3 1 ' and are of questionable reliability. Such reliability problems may conflict with due process.
Soviet-Source Evidence
The evidence used in Linnas' case from the Soviet Union is of A recent student note focused on the due process problems of Soviet-source evidence. 3 1 6 In this Note, the author described recent cases in which the validity of Soviet-source evidence was considered by the courts. 3 1 7 The author examined three cases that found Soviet-source evidence problematic 31 8 and three cases that assessed it favorably.
3 1 9 Noting that the Soviet Union picks the witnesses, In Laipenieks, the court was concerned about deposition evidence because during the depositions in the Soviet Union, "the Soviet Procurator, in the presence of the witnesses, continually referred to the matter as the 'war criminal case' or the 'Nazi criminal Laipenieks case.' The IJ found that the prejudicial and highly suggestive language used by the Soviet official tainted the deposition proceedings.-3 27 The court in Kowalchuk viewed the testimony of Soviet witnesses with "skeptism," stating, "the fact remains that these witnesses were all selected and made available by the Soviet government and were under its control; they could scarcely be expected to testify except in support of the chanrges originally aired by the Soviet government for its own reasons."
3 28
Perhaps the most striking of the cases was United States v. Kungys, 32 9 in which a NewJersey district court confronted a situation similar to that of Linnas. The government in Kungys relied on Soviet-supplied depositions Lo denaturalize a Lithuanian who allegedly committed war crimes. The court in Kungys noted that the Soviets had a strong interest in war criminal cases and, thus, the courts should examine with particular care any finding reached by the aid of Soviet authorities. 33 0 In doing so, the court recognized that the KGB prepared the witnesses prior to their depositions by United States authorities. 331 The court questioned the validity of these depositions 3 32 and decided that the depositions were inadmissible for the purpose of proving that Kungys had participated in the killings.
3 33 Thus, this court recognized the reliability problems associated with Soviet-supplied evidence. There is, however, an alternate view that the world should "forget the Holocaust and get on with life." '3 37 However, "forgetting an occurrence before fully realizing its moral implications and adequately dealing with them is morally irresponsible. ' 3 3 8 In light of such moral implications and the due process and eighth amendment problems that arise in the process of denaturalizing and deporting alleged Nazi war criminals, it is inadvisable to end discussion of the Linnas case without suggesting a possible solution. The United States could take responsibility for its acquiescence to the presence of war criminals within its borders by bringing these criminals to trial within its own territory. 3 3 9 The United States normally would not have jurisdiction over these criminals. Under the sixth amend- 1985) . 350 Id. at 575.
Demjanjuk to Israel to stand trial. 3 51 The Sixth Circuit ordered the extradition, recognizing "that some crimes are so universally condemned that the perpetrators are the enemies of all people. Therefore, any nation which has custody of the perpetrators may punish them according to its law applicable to such offenses." 35 2 Thus, the court held that the fact that Demjanjuk allegedly committed the crimes in Poland did not "deprive Israel of authority to bring him to trial." 3 53
A specific treaty also exists that gives the United States the ability to prosecute war criminals. In 1986, the United States Senate ratified the Genocide Convention. 354 A creation of the United Nations, the Genocide Convention confirmed that genocide was a crime under international law. 35 5 The Convention provided for the punishment of "[p]ersons committing genocide" and other related crimes. 3 56 The parties agreeing to the Convention: undertake to enact, in accordance with their respective constitutions, the necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions of the present Convention and, in particular, to provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide or of any of the other acts enumerated in article II1. 357 Thus, as a party to this Convention, the United States is under a treaty obligation to "provide effective penalties" for those committing genocide, which would include Nazi war criminals. While one could argue that the Holtzman Amendment has effectively done this, the problems that arise under the due process clause and eighth amendment call for another solution. 358 Further, the Convention calls for "effective penalties.1 359 The Holtzman Amendment would not work as an effective penalty if the United States sent Linnas, as then Attorney General Meese tried to do, to Panama. 3 60 Linnas faced no prosecution in Panama. In effect, he would have escaped all penalties for his war crimes. Thus, by trying him in the United States, the Government would be assured that he was brought to justice, in keeping with the Genocide Convention.
There remains one difficulty in invoking the Genocide Convention as a means to bringing alleged Nazi war criminals to justice in the United States. The Genocide Convention contains a jurisdictional provision, stating:
Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction. Under the second provision, no international tribunal currently exists to try alleged Nazi war criminals. Under the first portion of the jurisdictional provision, the United States would not seem to have jurisdiction, because the crimes did not take place in the United
States. Yet, this has not prevented other parties to the Convention from considering themselves competent tribunals to hear these cases. Like Israel and Canada, the United States should claim jurisdiction over alleged Nazi war criminals. At a minimum, legislators should make this provision for those, like Linnas, who face de facto extradition in the absence of an extradition treaty or who would face no penalty in the country of their deportation. In this way, individuals like Linnas would be assured of adequate due process, yet the accused would not escape justice, as those who are currently deported to non-hostile nations under the Holtzman Amendment. There still remains one problem in trying alleged Nazi war criminals in the United States. Even if Congress enacted a statute allowing for prosecution of Nazi war criminals in the United States, it is possible that the government could not bring such cases due to the ex post facto clause of the Constitution. 36 The United States Supreme Court in Weaver v. Graham 3 64 explored the ex post facto prohibition. At first glance, the Court's decision seems to work against the trial of alleged Nazis in the United States. The Court set out two requirements for a criminal or penal law to be ex post facto: "it must be retrospective, that is, it must apply to events occurring before its enactment, and it must disadvantage the offender affected by it." 6 5 A new law covering Nazi prosecutions looks retrospective, for currently there is no law that applies penal sanctions to Nazis. Yet, the United States has always criminalized murder. Further, the Court based these requirements on the purpose behind the ex post facto provision. The Court stated that "[t]hrough this prohibition, the Framers sought to assure that legislative Acts give fair warning of their effect and permit individuals to rely on their meaning until explicitly changed." 3 6 6 Thus, notice seems to be key to the intent behind ex post facto laws.
The Court described the importance of notice in ex post facto analysis in Dobbert v. Florida. 3 6 7 In Dobbert, the Court considered a murder case in which a valid death penalty statute did not exist at the time of the murders. 3 68 The Court stated, "[h]ere the existence of the statute served as an 'operative fact' to warn the petitioner of the penalty which Florida would seek to impose on him if he were convicted of first-degree murder. This was sufficient compliance with the ex post facto provision of the United States Constitution. ' 36 9 There are many possible "operative facts" that could serve as notice to alleged Nazis such as Linnas, including the criminalization of murder in the United States and the Genocide Convention.
Under international law, the United States recognizes Nazi atrocities as crimes. Indeed, the United States' participation in the 364 criminals residing in the United States. Though an admirable effort, the "solution" may violate the due process and eighth amendment rights of these alleged criminals. By trying individuals such as Linnas in the United States, the courts can protect such persons' constitutional rights. In addition, it can insure that these people will face their accusers and be brought to justice. As it stands, the current deportation and denaturalization processes merely act as a means to circumvent eighth amendment and due process rights accorded these individuals by virtue of their presence in the United States. It is up to either the courts to find the Holtzman Amendment unconstitutional or Congress to change the amendment, at least in cases such as that of Linnas. Congress, then, could grant jurisdiction to United States courts to make certain that the United States will bring these alleged Nazi war criminals to justice.
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